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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN INTERPRETING 
DOMESTIC LAW? 
Mark A. Barnett1 
MICHAEL SCHARF: All right. Good afternoon, everybody. Let’s go 
ahead and get started. For those of you who don’t know me, I am 
Michael Scharf, the Interim Dean here at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law and also the director of its International 
Law Center, the Cox Center, and we have had a wonderful semester 
of events, and I see many people in the audience that we have had at 
our other events. 
This is our last event of the semester. It seems like it has gone by 
really quickly, but I feel like we have saved the best for last in a lot of 
ways. If you have been here all semester, it kicked off with a huge 
international conference about high tech weaponry and super soldiers, 
so something a little bit, you know, outside the ordinary. We have 
had panels on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. We had Mark Ellis, 
the Executive Director of the International Bar Association, launch 
publicly for the first time ever his new app that will be used to record 
evidence of war crimes around the world. And we are going to end 
with a really, really special lecture by Judge Mark Barnett. Professor 
Juscelino Colares is going to introduce you to Mark, but I will say 
what makes this particularly special for me is that I have known some 
people for a long time, and yes, I am getting a little gray. I knew, for 
example, Madeline Albright when she was just a professor and 
Samantha Power who has spoken here when she was just a journalist. 
 
1. Mark A. Barnett is a judge on the United States Court of International 
Trade. He was appointed by President Barack Obama to the position on 
May 28, 2013. Prior to his judicial appointment, Judge Barnett practiced in 
the international trade group at Steptoe & Johnson before joining the Office 
of Chief Counsel for Import Administration at the Department of 
Commerce from 1998 to 2013, where he successively held the posts of staff 
attorney, senior counsel, and Deputy Chief Counsel. During his tenure at 
the Department of Commerce, Judge Barnett was a member of the United 
States negotiating teams for the United States-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement, the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round Rules Negotiating 
Group, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership and represented the United 
States before dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization and binational panels composed under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. From 2008–09, Judge Barnett was 
detailed to the United States House of Representatives, Committee on 
Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade as a Trade Counsel. 
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But Mark I have known perhaps the longest. In college, we ran 
the national high school model UN conference together. I was the 
secretary general. He was the undersecretary general. We had 50 
college students that were our staff and 2000 high school students at 
the real UN portraying the United Nations, and I think both of us 
would say that our careers in international law and our love for 
international law was launched way back then. And it is such a treat 
to have a friend from that long ago that has now become a Judge of 
the U.S. Court of International Trade. And please join me, first, in 
welcoming Juscelino Colares, who will give you the biographical 
information to introduce Judge Barnett. 
(Applause) 
 
JUSCELINO COLARES: Thank you all for being here. Again, my 
name is Juscelino Colares, and I teach here at Case. I have been here 
for three years. I teach international trade law and a bunch of other 
courses, but it is very rare that, as an academic former prior who has 
had, you know, some years of practice in D.C. in the trade area, that 
you actually meet experts that are as qualified as Mark, as Judge 
Barnett—sorry, Mark—as Judge Barnett.  
He graduated with very high honors from Dickinson College, 
Michigan Law School, and he went from that to a career as a lawyer 
at Steptoe & Johnson, at one of the best firms, trade firms in D.C., 
which I appeared often as a guest in my old days. And from there, he 
served 18 years at the Department of Commerce doing all these trade 
investigations and also helping defend and prosecute cases before 
NAFTA and WTO panels. And from there, he served some time—a 
year I believe—on the Hill, on the Ways and Means Committee, and 
from there he got appointed to—and very deservedly so—to the 
United States Court of International Trade, an Article III Court that 
handles customs and trade remedy issues, trade remedy disputes, 
challenges to customs, orders, and trade remedy determinations by 
the United States Department of Commerce and the United States 
Trade Commission. 
It is, indeed, a great honor, the Judge is going to be talking here 
today about the effect, the importance, the role of international 
decisions by tribunals on international trade matters on U.S. law, and 
I could not think of anyone better qualified to speak on the subject 
than Judge Barnett. 
Please welcome Judge Mark Barnett. 
(Applause) 
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MARK BARNETT: Good afternoon. I want to begin by thanking 
Dean Scharf for inviting me to speak with you here today. As one of 
two new judges on Court of International Trade,2 I often get requests 
to spend some time visiting with foreign judges and other officials 
who come to see the Court and learn about our Court. But those 
invitations typically come with little notice and usually without an 
included tour of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. So I want to thank 
you, Michael, for that. 
I am sure actually that the Dean is not aware of this, but I have a 
connection to Case Western’s Law School. My late father-in-law, 
Stephen Franko, is an alum from the class of 1950 when it was still 
Western Reserve University, and the degree he received was a 
Bachelor of Laws. Interestingly, then, in 1968, after the University 
became Case Western Reserve University, they reissued his degree as 
a juris doctor. My wife recently showed me an article that was 
published in your alumni magazine back in 1985 about my father-in-
law and, in part—in connection with my coming out here today. And 
so I appreciated that chance to get to know a little more about him 
and his career. And it was all as a result of my agreeing to come 
speak with you today. So I really do appreciate that; got to spend a 
little bit of time this afternoon wandering about University Circle and 
some of the campus buildings here, and I love the architecture. And I 
am sure he would be very impressed if he were to come see it all 
today. So thank you again for this opportunity. 
Let me start off by giving you a little bit of background, first on 
myself, and then about the Court on which I sit. Primarily to give 
you a sense of the experience that forms my perspective on the 
interplay of international obligations with domestic law. Prior to 
being appointed to the bench, as Professor Colares told you, I spent 
18 years in the General Counsel’s Office at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, and for the last eight years there I was the Deputy Chief 
Counsel for Import Administration. In that role, along with the chief 
counsel and a staff of roughly 30 attorneys, we provided legal advice 
to what was then called Import Administration, the agency within the 
Department of Commerce that’s responsible for administering the 
U.S. Unfair Trade laws; in other words, the antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws. As the attorneys for Import Administration, 
we advise the agency on all aspects of its antidumping and 
countervailing duty, participating as members of Import 
Administration’s team along with analysts, accountants, policy 
advisors, and others as they conducted their investigations and other 
 
2. See 159 CONG. REC. S3877–78 (daily ed. May 23, 2013) (vote granting 
Senate advice and consent to the nominations of Mark A. Barnett and 
Claire R. Kelly to the United States Court of International Trade). 
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administrative proceedings. And we reviewed their determinations for 
legal sufficiency. Those determinations could then be challenged in 
several different fora, sometimes simultaneously. Within the U.S. legal 
system, any party that was involved in the administrative proceeding 
could challenge the determination before Court of International 
Trade, on which I now sit. 
Attorneys from Commerce would work closely with the 
Department of Justice attorneys to defend the agency’s 
determinations, drafting briefs, and preparing the DOJ attorneys for 
oral arguments. If the case involved imports from Canada or Mexico, 
the parties have the option of taking their case to a binational panel 
composed pursuant to Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, instead of Court of 
International Trade.3 In these NAFTA panels are ad hoc panels of 
experts, practitioners, and academics composed for hearing the 
individual case.4 By the terms of the NAFTA agreement, these panels 
apply the domestic law of the country in which the determination was 
made.5 In these cases, Commerce has its own litigating authority, and 
their attorneys draft and file the briefs, and they make the oral 
arguments directly to the binational panels.6 
In addition to these challenges under domestic law, the 
government of the exporting country may elect to challenge 
Commerce’s determination or its practice, its regulation, or even the 
statute before a dispute settlement panel at the World Trade 
Organization with, of course, the possibility of an appeal to the 
WTO’s appellate body.7 In these cases, the Commerce attorneys work 
side by side with attorneys from U.S. Trade Representatives Office 
drafting the written submissions and arguing the cases in Geneva. I 
should note that in addition to providing legal advice during the 
administrative proceedings and defending the determinations in 
litigation, Commerce attorneys also work closely with senior officials 
in the client office in international negotiations. So whether it is a 
case specific suspension agreement, as was recently announced, for 
example, in the sugar dispute with Mexico Free Trade Agreement,8 
 
3.  North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1901–11, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf. 
4.  Id. art. 2009. 
5.  Id. art. 1904. 
6.  Id. art. 2013. 
7. See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm#
appeals (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
8. Ross Korves, U.S.-Mexican Sugar Suspension Agreement, TRUTH ABOUT 
TRADE & TECH. (Nov. 28, 2014), https:// truthabouttrade.org/ 
2014/11/28/u-s-mexican-sugar-suspension-agreement/.  
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negotiations such as the ongoing TransPacific partnership or TPP and 
TransAtlantic Trade Investment Partnership or TTIP that we are 
negotiating with Europe, or the WTO’s Doha round negotiations to 
revise, among other things, the antidumping agreement and the 
subsidies in countervailing measures agreement;9 in these roles, I was 
fortunate enough to be able to combine my legal and litigation 
experience with my understanding of the policy concerns of our team 
in order to assist in achieving our negotiating objectives. 
Now, as I turn to a quick bit of background on Court of 
International Trade, let me ask if anyone here knows what the first 
case tried before the first judge appointed to the first court that was 
organized in the United States? 
(No response) 
MARK BARNETT: The case was United States v. Three Boxes of 
Ironmongery.10 It was a case about the amount of customs duty 
charged on the imports of certain goods, and I am told “ironmongery” 
is the technical term for stuff made out of iron.11 But this is your 
trivia part of the talk. The case was tried before Judge Duane of the 
District Court for the District of New York, and the courthouses now 
for both the Southern District of New York and Court of 
International Trade sit in lower Manhattan, sit on Duane Street 
named after Judge Duane. But the important thing about the little 
trivia option here is what we are talking about is a customs case, first 
case tried in the United States, and it was the first of what would 
become many. 
You will recall, in the days before the income tax, customs duties 
were a critical source of revenue for the United States, and, even then, 
there were enough lawyers around challenging the duties assessed on 
imports to the point where it started to threaten to overwhelm the 
district courts. So, over time, the administrative appeals process 
developed, and a specialized Article I Court was created to relieve the 
burden on the district courts and provide judicial review in these 
customs cases. Fast forward now to 1980, Congress passed the 
Customs Court Act of 1980, and there what they did was clarify and 
expand the status, the jurisdiction, and the powers of the U.S. 
Customs Court, making it a full Article III Court and changing its 
 
9. World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).   
10. See John D. Winter & Richard Maidman, Retelling the History of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
NYSBA NYLITIGATOR, Summer 2012, at 9.  
11. See id. “Ironmongery” is defined as “a hardware store or business” or 
alternatively, as “the stock of a hardware store; hardware.” 
Ironmongery, DICTIONARY.COM, http:// dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/ironmongery (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).   
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Role of International Dispute Resolution in Interpreting Domestic Law 
288 
name to the U.S. Court of International Trade.12 So Court of 
International Trade, or CIT, is a trial level court, like the district 
courts around the country, even though we have few trials, and most 
of our cases involve review of agency record and oral argument on 
written briefs more like what you will see at the circuit courts. Also 
unlike the district courts, we have national jurisdiction but limited 
subject matter jurisdiction.13 
In these days, most of our cases, as Professor Colares talked 
about, fall into one of four categories: Appeals of Commerce decisions 
in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, appeals of injury 
determinations by International Trade Commission, appeals of protest 
determinations from customs and border protection, and cases 
involving things like classification and valuation on imports and 
penalty cases that are brought by customs and border protection, 
whether it is negligence, gross negligence, or fraud cases.14 
Let me turn now to the main subject of my remarks, and that’s 
the relevance of international trade agreements and dispute 
settlement findings in the domestic interpretation of our trade laws. 
In the practice of international trade law, parties may seek to raise 
international obligations in several ways. First, they might attempt to 
raise a WTO obligation during the administrative proceeding before 
Commerce. In that case, they typically receive little more than a one-
sentence reply, something to the effect that “U.S. law as implemented 
through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act is fully consistent with 
our WTO obligations,” and that’s likely to be the response they get. 
Regardless of whether the party is questioning the consistency of the 
statute, a regulation, or a practice with the WTO agreements, 
Commerce has no authority to change the trade law statutes and, 
within the confines of a particular administrative proceeding, is no 
more able to rewrite its regulations. 
While Commerce, like any other agency, has the ability to change 
an administrative practice, provided it articulates a rationale for the 
change, the agency’s general position has been that its practices, 
which it has developed over time and in conformity with its governing 
statute and regulations, is WTO consistent. Period. And I should 
note, that while Court of International Trade often requires the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies in order to challenge some 
aspect of Commerce’s determination before our Court, no such 
 
12. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).  
13. See Jurisdiction of the Court, U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE, http://www. 
cit.uscourts.gov/AboutTheCourt.html (last modified Feb. 27, 2015).  
14. See, e.g., Coal. of Gulf Shrimp Indus. v. United States, No. 13-00386, 
slip op. 15-29 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 3, 2015) (challenge to ITC’s final 
injury determination).   
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requirement exists at the WTO.15 Similarly, while Court of 
International Trade typically disregards post-hoc reasoning that is 
offered in litigation where that reasoning cannot be traced back to the 
agency determination itself, again there is no similar practice in WTO 
dispute settlement.16 Consequently, neither the individual party that 
is appearing before Commerce, nor Commerce itself, has any need to 
preview any of its WTO arguments during the administrative 
proceeding. 
Now, a party may also seek to raise a WTO argument before a 
domestic court or a NAFTA panel, and, as I noted in my introduction 
when reviewing Commerce determinations, NAFTA panels are 
required to apply U.S. law by the terms of article 1904 of the 
NAFTA.17 That provision requires the panel to determine whether the 
antidumping and countervailing duty determination is in accordance 
with the antidumping and countervailing duty law of the importing 
party. It goes on to say—and I will quote for this purpose—“the 
antidumping and countervailing duty law consists of the relevant 
statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and 
judicial precedence to the extent that a court of the importing party 
would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of the 
competent investigating party.”18 Thus, when a NAFTA panel reviews 
a determination by Commerce, it stands in place of the U.S. Court 
that must apply U.S. law. That’s why I group NAFTA panel review 
with U.S. Court review. In going forward, I am going to focus on just 
U.S. Court review. 
As a federal judge, a basic part of my duty is to interpret and 
apply U.S. law. However, we should keep in mind that the WTO 
agreements are not treaties. They were not ratified by the Senate, 
and, thus, as envisioned by the U.S. Constitution, they are not part of 
the supreme law of the land. Instead, what happened is Congress 
implemented the WTO agreements into U.S. law through the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and, as part of that 
implementation, they also approved the statement of administrative 
action as the authoritative interpretation of the statute.19 Therefore, 
 
15. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Parallel Proceedings at the WTO and Under 
NAFTA Chapter 19: Whither the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in DSU Reform?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 47, 58 (2007).  
16. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter DSU].  
17. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1904.  
18. Id.  
19. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 101, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994) [hereinafter URAA].  
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only the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and not any provision of 
the WTO agreement, has any direct effect in the United States. In 
case there was any doubt about this, when they passed the URAA, 
Congress included an express provision confirming that when a 
conflict exists between any WTO provision and U.S. law, U.S. law 
prevails.20 Having made clear that the WTO agreements themselves 
take a back seat to domestic law, it should come as no surprise that 
Congress and the executive branch also provided that dispute 
settlement reports do not override domestic law either.21 
The statement of administrative action provides the reports issued 
by panels or the appellate body under the DSU have no binding effect 
under the law of the United States and do not represent an expression 
of the U.S., foreign, or trade policy. If a report recommends that the 
United States change federal law to bring it into conformity with the 
Uruguay Round Agreement, it is for the Congress to decide whether 
any such change will be made. It is not a great surprise there, right? 
Congress is simply saying, if a statute is found to be WTO-
inconsistent, it is up to Congress to fix it. A dispute settlement report 
itself doesn’t directly invalidate the statute. 
Now, that deals with conflicts between dispute settlement reports 
and domestic statutes, but what about conflicts between those dispute 
settlement reports and U.S. regulations or agency determinations? 
There, too, the statement of administrative action provides that 
neither federal agencies nor state governments are bound by any 
finding or recommendation included in such reports.22 In particular, 
panel reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies to 
change their regulations or procedures. Again, the SAA is simply 
making it clear that the dispute settlement reports are not self-
executing. As we will see in a few minutes, this is not to say that 
agencies cannot alter their regulations or practices or procedures in 
response to an adverse WTO dispute settlement report. It just says 
that they have to have an independent authority under domestic law 
in order to make that kind of an alteration. 
We may be able to draw some useful parallels between this 
situation and the one the Supreme Court looked at in the Medellín v. 
Texas case in 2008.23 There the Court looked at the Vienna 
Convention on counselor relations along with a decision from the 
International Court of Justice.24 While that international agreement 
 
20. Id. § 102.  
21. Id. 
22. Id.  
23. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).  
24. Id. at 497 (discussing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31).  
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was a treaty and it was ratified by the United States, the Court found 
that neither the Vienna Convention nor the decision of the ICJ were 
self-executing.25 In fact, it considered that the United Nations Charter 
provides that members undertake to comply with the ICJ decision in 
any case in which it is a party signaling the need to take some action 
in the future, and that recourse in the case of noncompliance is to the 
UN Security Council where they noted that the U.S. holds a veto.26 
The combination of these factors made it clear to the majority of the 
Supreme Court that compliance with the decision of the ICJ was a 
matter for the political branches in the exercise of their foreign 
relations powers and not one that should be enforced by the domestic 
courts.27 
While the United States doesn’t hold anything close to a veto at 
the WTO, dispute settlement reports typically ask a party to bring 
their measure into conformity with the WTO agreement, a similar 
signaling of future action. The Dispute Settlement Understanding, the 
agreement that covers the dispute settlement system at the WTO, 
also contains provisions relating to the possibility of providing 
compensation rather than implementation and for the possibility of 
retaliation in the event of noncompliance. Similar to the situation 
examined in the Medellín case, I would suggest that these provisions 
provide a similar indication that compliance with adverse WTO 
decisions also is within the realm of the political branches and should 
not be enforced by the judicial branch. 
While parties may accept that the WTO, the agreements, as well 
as panel and appellate body reports do not have direct effect in the 
United States, let’s not stop them from arguing that WTO 
agreements and panel or appellate body reports interpreting those 
agreements should be used by the courts to construe U.S. law that is 
ambiguous. The authority cited for this proposition dates back to an 
1804 Supreme Court case called Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy.28 Therein the Court held that an act of Congress never been 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.29 This is consistent with current restatement in 
foreign relations law of the United States, which recognizes that while 
international obligations cannot override inconsistent requirements of 
domestic law, ambiguous statutory provisions should be construed, 
where possible, to be consistent with international obligations of the 
 
25. Id. at 506.  
26. Id. at 508.  
27. Id. at 511.  
28. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).  
29. Id. 
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United States.30 So the argument is that when Commerce has 
interpreted an ambiguous provision of the antidumping and 
countervailing duty statutes in a way that is inconsistent with our 
WTO obligations, as determined by a dispute settlement panel or the 
appellate body, domestic courts should apply the Charming Betsy 
Doctrine to require Commerce to revise its interpretation to be 
consistent with that dispute settlement interpretation. 
Now, there have been several responses offered to a Charming 
Betsy argument, some successful and others, at least directly 
speaking, less so. First, among the possible defenses is that the 
statutory provision in question is not ambiguous. Congress has clearly 
spoken on the issue, and if the statute is not ambiguous, then the 
Charming Betsy Doctrine cannot come into play. In such a case, 
domestic law prevails, and the contrary findings of the WTO 
settlement system must be resolved by Congressional action and not 
the courts.  
A second argument that has been made in unfair trade cases is 
that reliance on the Charming Betsy Doctrine by private parties has 
been foreclosed by statute. Section 3512 Title 19 of the U.S. Code 
provides that only the United States shall have a cause of action 
under any of the WTO agreements or by virtue of Congressional 
approval of the WTO agreements.31 Moreover, no private party may 
challenge an agency action as inconsistent with the WTO agreement. 
Generally, the courts have been reluctant to rely on this provision to 
decline jurisdiction over a challenge to an agency determination in the 
unfair trade area. In rejecting this argument, what they found is that 
the parties’ claim is being made under the domestic statute. In other 
words, it is a claim that is essentially a Chevron prong two type 
claim, which you probably learned about in administrative law; that 
the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable because it leads to this 
inconsistency.32 You might consider that to be a fine distinction, but 
that’s where the line has been drawn. 
Now, let me insert a side note here: Section 3512, to which I made 
reference, is definitely one sided. It prohibits private parties from 
making claims based on WTO agreements, but it doesn’t prevent the 
United States from relying on the WTO agreements and, to that 
extent, even relying on the Charming Betsy Doctrine. This is 
especially important when an agency takes action in order to 
implement an adverse WTO decision, and I will talk about that 
 
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 114 (1987).  
31. Relationship of Agreements to United States Law and State Law, 19 
U.S.C. § 3512 (2006).  
32. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  
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process in just a minute. But when it does so, the agency must 
explain the reasoning for its change in interpretation of the domestic 
law, and, in that case, it may rely on its stated goal of compliance 
with the WTO dispute settlement decision.33 To this end, in my 
previous career at Commerce, I have argued that while Charming 
Betsy cannot be used as a sword by private parties to force 
compliance by the United States, it can be used by the United States 
as a shield to defend their change in interpretation of the statute. 
A third argument that has been raised is that WTO panel and 
appellate body reports do not constitute the law of nations within the 
meaning of the Charming Betsy Doctrine. Article III-2 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding states that the dispute settlement system is 
meant to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.34 In the earliest days of the dispute settlement 
system, the appellate body stated that because the purpose of the 
DSU is to settle the particular dispute between members, quote, “we 
do not consider that Article III-2 of the DSU is meant to encourage 
either panels or the appellate body to make law by clarifying existing 
provisions of the WTO agreement outside the context of resolving a 
particular dispute.”35 Consistent with that, Article IX-2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement that created the World Trade Organization 
sets forth that the ministerial conference and the general counsel of 
the WTO have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the 
WTO agreements.36 Article III-9 of the DSU reconciles the dispute 
settlement system with Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
providing that the provisions of the DSU are without prejudice to the 
right of the WTO member to seek an authoritative interpretation 
from the ministerial conference for the general counsel.37 In short, a 
dispute settlement report only resolves the issue before the panel and 
as between the parties before the panel. Only the ministerial 
conference or general counsel can offer a broader binding 
interpretation. 
Accordingly, dispute settlement reports not involving the United 
States as a party do not create implementation obligations on the 
part of the United States. And the United States is under no 
 
33. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512.  
34. DSU, supra note 15, art. 2.  
35. Scope of Appellate Review, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s3_e.htm, (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015).  
36. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 9 
¶, 2 Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (hereinafter Marrakesh 
Agreement].  
37. DSU, supra note 15, art. 3 ¶ 9.  
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obligation to alter its laws or methodologies in response to such WTO 
dispute settlement reports. Without such broader applicability, it is 
difficult to argue that such reports constitute the law of nations. It is 
also difficult to make the case that dispute settlement reports 
represent the law of nations when the terms of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding recognize alternatives to implementation. In fact, as I 
mentioned earlier, a WTO member country may choose to respond to 
a panel or appellate body report without changing measure found to 
be inconsistent with the WTO agreements. To that end, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding provides for alternative resolutions, 
including the provision of trade compensation and other negotiated 
settlements or the suspension of benefits equivalent to the 
nullification or impairment of benefits caused by the offending 
measure.38 To return to the analogy I drew earlier with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Medellín, the structure of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, like the structure of the UN Charter, makes it clear 
that implementation or the manner in which non-implementation is 
addressed are issues that should be decided by the political branches, 
not the judicial branch. 
Finally, let me return to the issue of ambiguity in the statute and 
address it from a slightly different angle. Now, I said earlier that one 
argument that might be made against the application of Charming 
Betsy was that the statutory provision in question was not 
ambiguous. Let’s accept for the moment that the substantive 
provision at issue is ambiguous. Okay? But let’s also say that in 
abundance of what I would call precognition, Congress anticipated the 
situation in which a WTO dispute settlement report finds an agency’s 
discretionary interpretation or application of a statute to be WTO-
inconsistent and that Congress laid out a non-ambiguous procedure 
for addressing that finding, including provisions that clearly leave the 
executive branch with the discretion not to come into compliance. 
That’s, in fact, the situation that we have in the unfair trade area. 
With respect to the antidumping and countervailing duty 
matters, Congress provided two procedures by which the United 
States could come into compliance with an adverse WTO report. 
Regardless of which option we are talking about, compliance is only 
possible when it would be consistent with existing law. As I said 
earlier, if the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes require 
the WTO-inconsistent action, it is up to Congress to take the 
necessary action to come into compliance. The first method for 
implementation was set out in Section 123 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. Section 3533. It creates a procedure to 
amend, rescind, or modify an agency regulation or practice that is 
 
38. Id. art. 22.  
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found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreement.39 That change, 
however, cannot occur unless and until an elaborate consultation 
process has been undertaken. The steps include U.S. Trade 
Representatives Office and Commerce consulting with the appropriate 
Congressional committees along with private sector advisory 
committees, and providing an opportunity for public comment, all 
before determining whether and how to implement the WTO report. 
No implementation can become effective until relevant Congressional 
committees have also been given time to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with the proposed implementation. 
The second method for implementation was set out in Section 129 
of the URAA, now 19 U.S.C. Section 3538. This process is narrower 
in scope, and it applies to the situation in which a dispute settlement 
report finds that a particular action or determination by Commerce 
was not in conformity with U.S. WTO obligations.40 Like the earlier 
procedure, this one requires USTR and Commerce to consult with the 
relevant stakeholders before USTR determines whether to request 
Commerce to issue a new determination not inconsistent with the 
WTO report. Again, that’s a discretionary determination by USTR. 
Moreover, even after Commerce issues a new determination that is 
not inconsistent with the WTO report, the statute provides that 
USTR may direct Commerce to implement the determination, and it 
may do so in whole or in part.41 Now, this is where it gets fun, for 
some of us at least. These so-called Section 129 determinations, if 
USTR directs Commerce to implement them, they can be challenged 
in domestic court.42 So that challenge in domestic court is only to ask 
whether the determination, this 129 determination, is based on 
substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law; in other 
words, with U.S. law just like any other Commerce determination. 
What makes it interesting is that Commerce’s original 
determination may still be under review by the courts at the same 
time the Section 129 determination is being challenged. This is 
possible because the 129 determination only have prospective effect, 
so the original determination still covers imports made between the 
time of that original determination and the Section 129 
determination, and the 129 determination governs into the future. 
The statement of administrative action refers to such a scenario 
stating that, and I will quote,“in such situations, the administration 
 
39. URAA, supra note 18, § 123.  
40. Id. § 129.  
41. Id.  
42. See MARK A. BARNETT, THE CIT IN THE MIDDLE—INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS: AN OUTLINE (2011), available at http://www. cit.uscourts. 
gov/Judicial_Conferences/16th_Judicial_Conference/16th_Jud_Conf_
papers/Barnett%20Paper.pdf.  
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expects that courts and binational panels will be sensitive to the fact 
that the applicable standard of review that is set forth in statute and 
case law, multiple permissible interpretations of the law and facts 
may be legally permissible in any particular case, and the issuance of 
a different determination under Section 129 does not signify that the 
initial determination”—and I will put in brackets—“that was found to 
be WTO-inconsistent was unlawful.”43 
So how is that for a punch line in the area of the unfair trade 
laws, at least? Congress and the administration have pretty much put 
the Schooner Charming Betsy to rest at the bottom of the sea. So 
what’s the take-away from all this? Well, I would suggest that the 
take-away is that the unfair trade laws provide a helpful or at least 
an interesting case study if you face questions about the relevance of 
international law in a domestic setting. They can certainly be helpful 
to you in identifying questions to ask, analytical approaches to take 
regardless of the field of law in which you are considering the issue. If 
your career takes you to Capitol Hill or the executive branch, in some 
position where you might be developing implementing legislation 
relating to pretty much any kind of international agreement, 
regardless of whether it relates to the environment, human rights, 
terrorism, or any other field of law, there are lessons to be learned 
from here in terms of the scenarios that you might want to anticipate 
and account for so that you can make clear what happens when the 
inevitable conflicts arise between the implementing legislation and the 
international treaty agreement or law that you are seeking to 
implement. 
Thank you, again, for the kind invitation to come speak here 
today, and I look forward to taking some questions. Thank you. 
(Applause) 
 
JUSCELINO COLARES: Thank you, Mark. Thank you very much 
for your remarks, Judge Barnett. We have 22 minutes. We would 
very much like to welcome questions to you. I would like to start with 
one observation and one quick question. The observation is all my 
students in my international trade law class who are here, you should 
thank Judge Barnett for giving you the perfect outline to my 
international trade law course, and you should all be glad that I start 
with international trade law, not WTO law. 
Now, my question, Judge Barnett, is directed more to the former 
United States Department of Commerce official than to the Judge 
because the questions of law are pretty much settled, but I refer back 
to Mark Barnett, who used to work at the Department of Commerce, 
especially because of his interactions with the WTO appellate body 
and WTO panels, and the question is a simple one rather: If U.S. 
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trade courts, the Court of International Trade, which you now sit, 
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tend to review U.S. 
trade remedy determinations, antidumping countervailing duty law 
determinations, and they tend to uphold these agency’s decisions by 
about two thirds or upwards to two thirds of the time, why do you 
believe that NAFTA Chapter 19 panels, who have the same 
jurisdiction, tend to reverse U.S. agency decisions on the same law, 
applying or supposedly applying the same principles of administrative 
review of trade determinations at twice the rate, meaning U.S. courts 
tend to reverse Commerce and International Trade Commission 
decisions only thirty-two percent of the time; NAFTA panels tend to 
reverse Department of Commerce and International Trade 
Commission sixty-eight percent of the time, and why do you think 
that the same phenomenon seems to occur at the WTO panels and 
appellate body but not even at that rate, at the rate of around ninety 
percent? Thank you. 
MARK BARNETT: Interesting question. I think my first response is, 
I haven’t read your article yet, so I don’t know the right answer to 
provide. But I mean, I would offer a couple. 
JUSCELINO COLARES: Is it because you judges in the United 
States are biased? 
MARK BARNETT: Of course not. Of course not. No, I think 
probably a couple of different answers. I mean, depending on the 
group of cases you might be talking about, I think one option is there 
is certainly some reality to the fact that in some cases panelists tend 
to vote the flag, and I don’t want to overstate that. I mean, I start off 
with that because—I mean, we were talking for a while beforehand 
today. We were talking about one of the reasons, the biggest reason 
that Chapter 19 exists in NAFTA—I don’t believe, I don’t think 
anybody truly believes—is because the Canadians thought that U.S. 
Courts do not give an unbiased review of unfair trade cases because of 
lumber, one product, one big case, lots and lots and lots of money. I 
mean, we are talking billions of dollars at stake. I mean, you could 
pretty much add up, I suspect, all the other unfair trade cases that 
the United States has, and maybe they start to come close to what 
lumber is worth in terms of import values and duties that we had 
when the lumber cases, the lumber orders were in effect for a little 
while. So that’s a huge interest for Canada. And I think if you look 
back and you separate out the lumber decisions, the lumber panel 
reports, I think there you are going to be hard pressed to find a 
Canadian panelist who votes against Canada. 
But let’s put that one aside because I don’t want to be unfair to 
Canadian panelists or any other NAFTA panelist because I think for 
the most part, outside of that one context, I think NAFTA panels 
generally do a fairly decent job. That was our take on it at 
Commerce. To the extent that they are a little less forgiving of the 
agencies, I think that’s probably in the nature of who you have as 
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panelists, and I don’t mean this in a negative way; it is just you have 
ad hoc panels of experts, very often practitioners.44 These are folks 
that have argued before these agencies on one side or the other, 
whether representing U.S. domestic parties or Canadian parties or 
Mexican parties as the case may be, and so they probably have been a 
little bit frustrated by the kinds of issues that they may be dealing 
with. 
I mean, I am not suggesting that they have a direct conflict in 
terms of the issue they are addressing, but you know, they have been 
faced with Commerce decisions finding, oh, you didn’t give us a good 
enough response, and now we are going to make this adverse inference 
against your client, and they are going to get this really bad decision 
out of Commerce. And so there is probably some interest there in 
pushing the agency to do a little better job, maybe be a little more 
forgiving in those kind of situations. I think the expectations they 
come in with are probably higher than what some of us who have the 
benefit of a lifetime appointment come to expect from the agencies 
and come to expect in our review of agency determinations, but that’s 
my guess, and I look forward to reading your article and finding out 
the right answer. 
(Laughter) 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You do a great job of outlining the ways in 
which Commerce apparently—thank you again for the presentation of 
a model in a very murky field—you do a great job of how this one 
gray area of Congress thinking through very clearly and 
consequentially, exactly how to respond and treat applicable law. And 
so my question goes to the second level, which is so beyond applicable 
law, can you elaborate a little bit on your view of how they treat the 
issue of sources of interpretation and how strongly they have limited 
the sources of interpretation that agencies could use in determining 
nature, scope, of particular terms, term of art within that framework? 
Do they do a similar job of being fairly limiting, or do they allow 
reference to things like the U.S. position and the negotiations doing 
the round and things like that? 
MARK BARNETT: I mean, I was with you I think until the very 
end, and that is, let me say, the answer to your question is, I don’t 
think they are very limiting in general. As a domestic judge, the 
standard of review that we apply, for example, for most of these 
agency determinations is a standard not quite APA standard of 
review, whether there is substantial evidence in the record and 
whether the decision is otherwise in accordance with law.45 We apply 
Chevron all the time, and like I said, most of the decisions focus then 
 
44. See generally NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 2009-2010.  
45. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237 
(1946).  
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on substantial evidence.46 There is not a lot more development of that 
standard than that in terms of looking at other sources of law, if you 
will. It is very much the practice of administrative law with the 
umbrella of international hanging over it. But otherwise, it is really 
review on an agency record that is sent up to us in most of these 
cases. So I mean, something like the U.S. position in the negotiations, 
it may be of interest to us in an academic sense, if you will, but I 
think it is rare that it comes into play in our decision-making process. 
I will say there have been some judges, including some who were 
on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, who would talk a 
little more openly about, well, should we, since we are a specialized 
court in this area, be trying to think a little more about harmonizing 
U.S. law with our international obligations? And I mean, I wouldn’t 
necessarily subscribe to that position because I think Congress has 
laid out what our role is in the statute. Establishing our Court and 
establishing our standard of review, and I think for all the reasons 
that I said here today, I don’t know that the decision-making process 
in Geneva is necessarily something that should come to play in our 
interpretation of domestic law. 
Maybe I will come back to you since the microphone is in the 
back there. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What issues do you predict the international 
trade will be facing now that the OCS has published its notice that it 
will be limiting the “zeroing,” the “zeroing methodology” in order to 
provide the WTO regulations? What do you think the main issues 
will be? 
MARK BARNETT: Well, zeroing is going to continue to be an issue 
frankly. That’s going to be one of them. And the reason I say that is, 
I mean, what Commerce has done so far is back in 2006, 2007, they 
said, all right. In investigations where we use this one comparison 
methodology, we are going to stop, and then they said a few other 
things about comparison methodologies, but that doesn’t really come 
into play. Then after a couple of additional WTO decisions, they 
came out somewhat recently, about a couple years ago, and said in 
administrative reviews we are generally going to stop zeroing, and we 
have a default position. We are going to use an average-to-average 
comparison methodology and not zero. 
Let me pause for a second because I don’t want to assume that all 
of you know what I am talking about. You may be looking at me 
thinking what is he talking about in terms of zeroing? So the 30-
second explanation of what zeroing is, we talk about dumping cases 
on particular products. Well, a dumping case on a product isn’t a 
very specific thing. I mentioned lumber, Canadian lumber. So we had 
an order on the dumping of softwood lumber from Canada. Well, you 
 
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  
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know, all the lumber is not the same, and so when you do price 
comparisons on lumber, you look at U.S. sales of two-by-fours, 
compare it to Canadian sales of two-by-fours; you look at U.S. sales of 
six-by-sixes, compare it to Canadian sales of six-by-sixes. You make 
all those different comparisons. Maybe what you find out is, when you 
make those comparisons, the two-by-fours were dumped, they were 
sold in the United States too cheaply. They were sold for less than 
what they are sold for in Canada, and overall the U.S. industry is 
being hurt. The six-by-sixes, on the other hand, were sold for 
whatever reason at a higher price than normal value. The U.S. 
importer was paying more for those than what they would otherwise 
pay for them in Canada. 
The question is, when you put all that together, how do you do 
it? Do you just focus on the dumping that occurred with regard to 
the two-by-fours and maybe spread that out over all the imports of 
lumber, or do you actually reduce that amount of dumping that you 
found in the two-by-fours to account by which the six-by-sixes were 
sold at higher prices? Do you provide an offset in that case? U.S. 
practice forever has been no offset.47 That’s it. We just take the 
amount of dumping in this case, say, on two-by-fours, and then the 
denominator in that calculation is all lumber. So we spread that out 
over everything, and the amount of dumping duties we collect would 
just get it to the amount by which the two-by-fours were dumped. 
Okay? 
That became known as zeroing because what other countries 
argued. They got to name it because they came out and made the 
arguments first. If we had named it, we probably would have called it 
offsetting. We might have had better success if we had named it and 
named it offsetting. They called it “zeroing” though. They said what 
you are doing is, you are taking that negative dumping margin, and 
you are changing it. You are resetting it to zero, zeroing before you 
combine it all, and because you are changing it, that’s wrong. Okay. 
Nobody agreed to get rid of zeroing; U.S. position. Nobody agreed to 
get rid of zeroing in the Uruguay Round.48 Everybody who is really 
involved in negotiating it, not just the United States, Europe, 
Canada, Australia, everybody who had an active antidumping 
practice all did zeroing, even after the WTO agreement.49 And despite 
 
47. Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 
16, 2003) (adopted Jan. 27, 2003), available at https://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/217_234_abr_e.pdf.  
48. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 
Developing Countries, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http:// www. 
fao.org/docrep/004/w7814e/w7814e04.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
49. Appellate Body Report, supra note 46.  
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the fact that in other areas where they make big changes in the 
WTO, everybody made the changes to implement those changes in 
the agreement. So they put in this sunset provision; said okay. An 
order could live more or less forever. Now, with the WTO agreement, 
they said every five years you have got to review it. Nobody 
pretended that that didn’t exist. They all faithfully implemented that. 
The only thing that, according to the appellate body, nobody 
faithfully implemented was this ban on zeroing. 
In any case, to get back to the question now that we have a sense 
of what zeroing is, it is hard to answer it very precisely because then 
you get into comparison methodologies, you get into the stage of the 
proceeding, Commerce has gotten rid of it with one comparison 
methodology in investigations. They have gone as a default to a 
different comparison methodology in reviews where they have agreed 
not to use zeroing, but they have strengthened their practice with 
regard to what’s called targeted dumping where you might see a 
pattern of prices by customer, by region, or by time period in the 
United States that gives a sense that, well, maybe there is something 
a little fishy going on here, and in that case, instead of aggregating 
everything in these broad averages, we are going to disaggregate all 
the U.S. prices. And we are going to look at it transaction by 
transaction where the dumping has occurred. And in those cases, a lot 
of folks, a lot of panels, WTO panels, if you can agree that it only 
makes sense to do zeroing because if you don’t, think about it, 
mathematically, you end up as if you are just doing average-to-
average comparisons and providing that offset. 
So we are still zeroing in the targeted dumping context. That 
targeted dumping context has been changing, evolving over the last 
few years. They have just rolled out a new one within the last year-
and-a-half, two years thereabouts. The parameters of that are going 
to continue to be explored. I think it is Korea in their WTO challenge 
to either washers or the refrigerators’ determination, they are 
challenging at the WTO our targeted dumping methodology in 
investigations.50 So zeroing is going to continue to play out. 
What are the other big issues? The other big issue, frankly, is 
going to be China. It continues to be China. In the countervailing 
duty context subsidies, you can countervail subsidies where there is a 
financial contribution that provides a benefit, and it is specific based 
on region, industry, company, et cetera. For the longest time, the 
approach of the United States was in the context of a nonmarket 
economy like, you know, the Soviet Union, China, et cetera. The 
concept of a subsidy can’t really exist. You have got a centrally 
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planned economy. The fact that they are directing resources to one 
industry over another doesn’t really make any sense. It was affirmed 
back in the 1980s in Georgetown Steel that you didn’t apply the 
countervailing duty law to nonmarket economies.51   
In 2006, Commerce changed its position with regard to China. 
They said we think China, it is not really an on-or-off switch. They 
have evolved enough that, at least while we still consider them a 
nonmarket economy, you can – the concept of a subsidy has meaning 
within China, and they started applying a countervailing duty law. 
There were a number of cases in that area, how that has gone back 
and forth, and now while Congress has confirmed the ability to use 
the countervailing duty law with regard to China,52 they have also 
provided that where there is a demonstration that applying both the 
antidumping law and the countervailing duty law constitutes sort of a 
double remedy, overcounting, if you will, that Commerce should make 
an adjustment for that.53 
Well, this is, again, it all comes down to money because every 
dollar you don’t adjust for is an extra dollar that is collected at the 
border in a duty. So that methodology, as it is going to continue to be 
developed, is going to be fought over tooth and nail because that’s 
where all the cases are. I took a look—I think ninety-seven out of 
about two hundred and fifty antidumping cases are against China. 
Twenty-seven out of fifty-two, I think it is countervailing duty cases 
are against China. We have about three hundred orders. Almost half 
of them are against China. That’s where the money is going to be. 
That’s where the money is going to be, and that’s where the issues 
are going to be, I think, going forward to a large degree. 
Sorry, that was a long answer to a straightforward question. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But it is perfect as to my question, which is 
on double remedies and in the context of a customs penalty, gross 
negligence, or negligence penalty case where the penalty is typically a 
multiple of the loss of duties, the unpaid duties, or underpaid duties. 
Are you aware or can you perhaps comment on what type of 
reception the Court might give to an argument that an inconsistency 
with WTO obligations, which I believe double remedies has been 
determined as such, may be a mitigating factor in a penalty case? 
MARK BARNETT: I mean, I am not aware of any decision that has 
addressed that. So I mean, I certainly wouldn’t want to be prejudging 
 
51. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315-18 (Fed. 
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anything in terms of where it goes. I mean, I will say I am not sure—
you may be using sort of the concept of a double remedy and maybe 
combining two things together that don’t really belong together, 
because, at least in terms of the double remedy in the context of the 
application of antidumping and countervailing duty law, that’s a 
specific issue that arises, because of the nonmarket economy 
methodology that applies to China. And it is only because of that 
that you can have that concept of a double remedy. The fact that a 
penalty in a customs case might be a doubling of the duty, I don’t 
think that has the same concept, and I think even within the WTO I 
would be surprised if there is not enough authority in the WTO 
agreements, whether it is the customs valuation agreement or some of 
the other agreements there, to allow authorities in their sort of role to 
police imports to impose penalties in the case of noncompliance with 
domestic requirements. But you know, how any of those arguments, 
WTO type arguments, might play out in a customs, I don’t know 
that it has come up directly, so I really couldn’t speak to it there. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Mark, we are out of time, but I want to invite 
the audience to join us for a reception in the rotunda where we have 
appetizers and drinks, and we can get a chance to talk one on one 
with you, but before we leave please join me again in thanking Judge 
Barnett. 
(Applause) 
 
  
